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User Choices and Regret: Understanding Users’ 
Decision Process about Consensually Acquired 
Spyware 
NATHANIEL GOOD, JENS GROSSKLAGS, DAVID THAW,  
AARON PERZANOWSKI, DEIRDRE MULLIGAN, JOSEPH KONSTAN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Spyware is software which monitors user actions, gathers personal 
data, and/or displays advertisements to users.  While some 
spyware is installed surreptitiously, a surprising amount is 
installed on users’ computers with their active participation.  In 
some cases, users agree to accept spyware as part of a software 
bundle as a cost associated with gaining functionality they desire.  
In many other cases, however, users are unaware that they 
installed spyware, or of the consequences of that installation.  This 
lack of awareness occurs even when the functioning of the spyware 
is explicitly declared in the end user license agreement (EULA).  
We argue and demonstrate that poor interface design contributes 
to the difficulty end users experience when trying to manage their 
computing environment.  This paper reviews the legal, technical, 
and design issues related to the installation of spyware bundled 
with other software.  It reports on results of an experiment in 
which thirty-one users were asked to configure computers, 
deciding which software to install from a set of software that 
included disclosed spyware.  The results suggest that current 
EULA interfaces do little to encourage informed decision-making 
and that simpler interfaces with key terms highlighted have 
potential to improve informed decision-making.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Over the past several years spyware has emerged as a significant 
new threat to Internet-connected computers.  We use the term 
"spyware" to describe a class of software that resides on an 
individual's computer, using the resources of that computer to monitor 
the user's actions, display advertisements to the user, and/or engage in 
other activities commonly perceived by users as invasive or 
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undesirable.  Amazingly, these types of programs may reside on up to 
88% of all internet-connected computers [5].   
 Spyware and tools for managing it highlight an interesting junction 
of legal, technical, and HCI (human-computer interaction) research.  
While some spyware is installed unknowingly by users when they 
install freeware or shareware, or when they execute downloads 
transmitted through email, the web, or instant messages, much 
spyware is installed with the user's participation—it is installed during 
a software installation process that is apparent to the user and during 
which the program’s actions including spyware behaviors are 
disclosed.  Indeed, the reason that spyware is difficult to accurately 
define is that the same piece of software may be considered 
unacceptable spyware by one user, an acceptable trade for other 
services by another, or a valuable personalization system or notifier by 
a third.  Consider Google's Toolbar (toolbar.google.com) which 
explicitly asks for permission to monitor user web browsing so that it 
can provide more information to the user about the page being viewed. 
 Because of this user-centered definition of what constitutes 
spyware, for some portion of software that meets the definition of 
spyware, it seems inappropriate to adopt an outright ban. Early efforts 
to combat spyware—much like anti-virus software efforts—measured 
their success based on how infrequently the software was installed.  
While such a measure can help provide security, it may also limit 
users access to certain software combinations by denying them the 
opportunity to trade some privacy, speed, or attention for services or 
information they actually value.  Imagine if your computer "protected" 
you by preventing you from ever transmitting your credit card 
information over the Internet; it would perhaps reduce your 
vulnerability to identity theft, but would at the same time deny you the 
benefits of shopping online.  In the case of spyware, it isn't simply that 
the monitoring or notifications themselves may be valuable. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests, and our study confirms, that some users are willing 
to install spyware when the desired application with which it is 
bundled is of perceived high utility, and a comparable product without 
spyware is unavailable or unknown to the user [9].  In other words, at 
least in situations where users are unaware of other options, they are 
willing to give up some privacy, screenspace, or bandwidth as 
"payment" for an unrelated service or product they value.   
 Accordingly, managing spyware requires that we engage the user 
in controlling their desktop instead of assuming we can simply do it 
for them.  The End User Licensing Agreement, Terms of Service, 
Privacy Policy, or some combination (EULA herein) is the most 
common format for disclosing information about software behavior. 
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EULAs fail to engage users in the process of controlling the security 
and privacy settings of their computers, perhaps intentionally. 
Substantial evidence demonstrates that users rarely read long legal 
documents—such as EULAs—particularly when displayed in small 
windows and in a manner that interrupts the installation process.  
Providing information and requiring the user to acknowledge its 
receipt  prior to installation appears to be the correct approach for 
several reasons (including the difficulty of uninstalling software 
programs), but current EULAs, driven largely by legal concerns, do 
not foster end user control over the desktop.  Users typically either do 
not read or do not understand EULAs. In addition, businesses, and to a 
lesser extent other end users, are paying dearly for the proliferation of 
spyware.  Equipment and service providers both handle an 
increasingly high level of customer complaints and customer service 
calls based on spyware.  
 In software installation decisions, informed consent is a problem in 
human-computer interaction, and specifically a problem in interface 
and interaction design, that should not be left solely to the lawyers.   
 This paper first provides an overview of the legal, technical, and 
design issues involved in helping users manage spyware that is 
disclosed in EULAs.  This overview leads to a discussion of the 
possible "solution graphs" through which inappropriate spyware can 
be avoided without preventing users from installing similar software 
that they value.  We then report on the results of a set of experiments 
in which different installation and consent interfaces were used in an 
attempt to improve user decision-making and discuss the implications 
for both design and future research.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  DEFINITION OF SPYWARE 
 A fundamental problem is the lack of a standard definition of 
spyware. Two particularly contested issues are the range of software 
behaviors that should be included in the definition and the degree of 
user consent that is desirable. 
 First, some prefer a narrow definition that focuses on the 
surveillance aspects of spyware and its ability to collect, store, and 
communicate information about users and their behavior.  Others use a 
broad definition that includes adware (software that displays 
advertising), toolbars, search tools, hijackers (software that redirects 
web traffic or replaces web content with unexpected or unwanted 
content), and dialers (programs that redirect a computer or a modem to 
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dial a toll phone number). Definitions for spyware also include hacker 
tools for remote access and administration, keylogging, and cracking 
passwords.   
 Second, there is limited agreement on the legitimacy of software 
that engages in behavior such as targeting advertisements and 
installing programs on user machines that collect click stream data. 
Users consider a wide range of programs that present spyware-like 
functionality unacceptable.  However, spyware-like functionality may 
be acceptable, even desired, in some contexts but objectionable in 
others (e.g., keylogging as a parental control tool v. keylogging 
software installed on an adult’s private computer without consent). At 
times the boundary between spyware and legitimate data collection or 
advertising practice hinges on whether the user is a willing participant 
in the activity.  For example, some personalization features require 
detailed monitoring of end user interaction with software and/or web 
content. Where the functionality provided by the software is desired, 
and the user has actively chosen to allow data to be collected and used 
for the purpose of personalization, privacy grounds for intervening in 
the transaction on behalf of the individual are some what diminished. 
Although the effects of spyware on third parties and doubts about the 
ability of end users to fully understand the consequences of their 
decision to allow data collection (for example, a subpoena for their 
search terms), may support legal intervention even where spyware 
behavior is agreeable to the end user at the point of software 
installation. The practice of bundling software, which merges spyware 
with unrelated programs, heightens concerns with the ability of end 
users to comprehend the ramifications of data collection and 
advertising practices. Thus, providing another rationale for advocating 
interventions in private decisions about software installation to protect 
against externalities that weaken the security of the network overall, 
and place economic burdens on third parties like service and 
equipment providers. 
 In July 2005 the Anti-Spyware Coalition (ASC), a coalition of 
anti-spyware software companies, academics, and consumer groups, 
released a document establishing its definition of spyware. The ASC 
defines spyware as:  
Technologies deployed without appropriate user consent 
and/or implemented in ways that impair user control over: 
Material changes that affect their user experience, privacy, 
or system security; 
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Use of their system resources, including what programs are 
installed on their computers; and/or 
Collection, use, and distribution of their personal or other 
sensitive information.1 
 This definition is quite broad including a wide range of software 
behavior, and hinges in large part on the manner in which the software 
impairs user control over their computer or engages in behavior 
without “appropriate user consent.”  The emergence of a consensus 
definition is an important step in addressing spyware through 
technological, market, and regulatory mechanisms.1  The question of 
what indicates “appropriate user consent” to permit certain software 
behaviors is addressed in a second document released in January 2006 
by ASC.2 The ASC Risk Model Description document sets out a series 
of factors, including notices and control options (opt-out/opt-in) 
during installation among others, that ASC members consider when 
determining whether a given piece of software is spyware. 
Importantly, the document provides insight into the complicated, 
multi-factor balancing that is conducted by these private companies in 
determining whether to block, warn users, or allow a software 
installation to occur.  
B.  LEGAL ISSUES 
 Spyware legislation is under consideration in twenty-seven U.S. 
states and in the U.S. Congress. At least twelve states have enacted 
spyware legislation.  The proposals vary in their focus and scope, 
ranging from restrictions or prohibitions on unsolicited 
advertisements, to prohibitions on the unconsented to transmission of 
personally identifiable information, to requirements that spyware 
contain removal procedures, to demands on consumer protection 
agencies to collect complaints.  The diversity among state and federal 
proposals reflects a diverse view of the problem, as well as the 
 
 
 
 
1 Anti-Spyware Coalition, “Anti-Spyware Coalition Definition and Supporting Documents.” 
http://www.antispywarecoalition.org/documents/definitions.htm. 
2 Anti-Spyware Coalition, “Anti-Spyware Coalition Risk Model.” 
http://www.antispywarecoalition.org/documents/RiskModelDescription.htm.   
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influence of various parties who have supported and opposed spyware 
legislation.  
 The spyware provisions that limit or prohibit the collection or 
transmission of certain personal information without the individual 
data subject’s consent are consistent with general principles of data 
protection.  Europe's data privacy and data protection laws, while not 
spyware specific, embody this principle.  In general, these laws require 
that information be collected for a lawful and limited purpose, and that 
individuals consent to the collection of their data, be informed of the 
use, have the right to inspect and correct such data, and the right to 
revoke consent in the future. The focus on informed consent in the 
data protection context, resonates with the ASC’s focus on 
“appropriate user consent” and extended consideration of factors that 
may evince such consent in the Risk Modeling document. 
 In the absence of specific spyware statutes, spyware is governed 
by existing laws governing contracts, fraud, and computer hacking.  
An examination of the few U.S. cases that directly address spyware 
shows that the courts place a strong emphasis on the existence of an 
agreement with the user to install the software.3  For example, in 
Federal Trade Commission v. Seismic Entertainment,4 the FTC 
alleged that the Seismic’s software script exploited web browser 
security vulnerabilities to download and install programs without the 
computer user's knowledge or authorization. The surreptitiously 
installed software then served ads promoting Seismic's anti-spyware 
software. The court found the FTC likely to succeed in a case based on 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices and granted a temporary 
restraining order against Seismic.  
 Given the courts’ focus on consent, many spyware programs, 
particularly those distributed through channels with legitimate 
reputations, attempt to establish an agreement with the user through a 
EULA.  Software EULAs are governed by traditional contract law. 
The formation of a legally enforceable agreement requires a concrete 
offer by one party and clear acceptance of that offer by the second 
party. Contracts are binding because they represent the parties’ mutual 
 
 
 
 
3 New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer filed charges against Intermix Media for trespass, 
false advertising, and deceptive business practices. Intermix distributed screensavers and 
games bundled with spyware. These charges, which were settled before a court decision, 
stemmed in part from misleading, inaccurate, or nonexistent EULAs.  
4 FTC v. Seismic Entm't Prod’s, No. 04-377-JD, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22788 (D.N.H. 
October 21, 2004). 
2006] GOOD, ET AL. 289 
 
 
assent to bargained-for terms. This meeting of the minds is central to 
the legal justification for contract enforcement. 
 In the software EULA context, the traditional contract paradigm 
faces difficulties. Most importantly, end users’ manifestations of 
consent are often ambiguous. Some software is governed by terms 
merely posted to the web page from which the software is 
downloaded.5 These browsewrap agreements require no overt act 
during installation on the part of the end user to demonstrate assent to 
the EULA terms. Similarly, courts have enforced shrinkwrap 
agreements that purport to bind users to EULA terms that appear on 
software packaging simply because the user opened the package.6  
 Even clickwrap agreements, which require users to click the 
ubiquitous “I Agree” button, pose problems. Often end users fail to 
understand the purpose or legal significance of EULAs.  And, of 
course, many simply have become conditioned to view them as a 
meaningless but necessary hurdle in the software installation process.  
As a result, users often fail to read them. Even those that do read 
EULAs often find the documents indecipherable because of their 
length, the format in which they are displayed, and the use of 
specialized technical and legal language.  
 If users read and understood the terms of software EULAs, many 
would be surprised by the number of legal obligations they create. For 
example, after just a few clicks, a user installing KaZaA agrees to 
provisions that prohibit reverse engineering, altering registry keys, 
disabling advertisements, and removing third party software. In 
addition the user “assents” to no less than three "choice of law" 
provisions and an arbitration clause. The user indemnifies the software 
providers for any infringing transmissions and permits the sharing of 
contact information and browsing history for the purposes of receiving 
promotional emails and targeted advertisements. The software 
companies disclaim any warranties and limit their liability for the 
misuse of personal data or damage to the user’s computer. These 
agreements claim to bind all subsequent users of the software, 
regardless of their awareness of the EULA terms.   While it is certainly 
likely that some users would willingly agree to those terms in order to 
use KaZaA, we strongly doubt that all users who clicked through the 
KaZaA EULA would have a genuine "meeting of the minds."  Indeed, 
 
 
 
 
5 Specht v. AOL, 306 F.3d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 2002).  
6 Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc. , 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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our results below show that some users regret installing programs like 
KaZaA after being informed of the contents of the EULA.  
 Despite the problems EULAs present, courts typically enforce 
them. Even in more traditional contract contexts, performance of an 
act can serve as acceptance of a contract. In the EULA context, courts 
typically find that installing or using the software is sufficient to 
establish acceptance of EULA terms even when users are not required 
to click “I Agree.”7  Further, the user’s failure to read a EULA rarely 
mitigates against a conclusion of contract formation. When a 
document is reasonably understood to create legal obligations, courts 
impose a duty to read.8   This obligation to read extends not just to 
EULAs but to documents hyperlinked from EULAs as well.9 And 
while EULA language is far from clear, courts are reluctant to excuse 
violations on the basis of confusing language.  
 At the same time, some courts have called into question whether 
users have agreed to EULA terms.  In Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC,10  
the court refused to require arbitration, as specified in the EULA, by 
finding that agreement to the EULA was itself a triable issue of fact.  
Courts have great latitude in determining whether a contract is in 
place. They may even refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts, 
although they rarely do so.  Part of the motivation for our research is 
to provide objective data on whether users understand the nature of 
their agreement and the terms to which they agree when installing 
spyware which is disclosed in the software EULA.   
C.  TECHNICAL ISSUES 
 While a detailed discussion of technical approaches to addressing 
spyware goes beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to review 
the most common solutions in use and to discuss the limitations and 
potential of these solutions.  Dozens of spyware defense software 
packages focus on scanning a computer to identify and remove 
suspicious software, registry keys, and files.  Others prevent software 
 
 
 
 
7 See Tarra Zynda, Note, Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.: Preserving Minimum 
Requirements of Contract on the Internet, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 495, 504-505 (2004). 
8 Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989). 
9 Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
10Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1228 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
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from making certain system changes (e.g., modifying registry keys or 
the browser home page).   
 A smaller number of products protect against leaks of personal 
information. For example, Norton Internet Security blocks 
transmission of personal data via web forms, e-mail, instant 
messenger, etc., without user knowledge or consent.  More specific 
tools such as eBay's toolbar protect against disclosure of particular 
sorts of data, in this case eBay passwords.   
 Some argue that instead of designing better notices which 
consumers will ignore, we should concentrate on designing better 
technology because in the end, “users just want us to do it all for 
them.” The argument is that users lack the skill, methods, or desire to 
manage their computer and protect themselves from Spyware and are 
therefore willing to relinquish this responsibility to a software program 
or operating system, trusting technological means to handle this 
effectively. Virus programs were unwanted hosts that were stowaways 
on legitimate applications, often causing unwanted effects from the 
benign (displaying short messages or poems like “elk Cloner”) to 
damaging files on the infected host or coordinating massive DDOS 
attacks on high traffic targets. The industry that sprang up to defeat 
this threat had one mission, to successfully detect and eliminate these 
stowaway programs and remove them from their infected applications. 
The question is, why shouldn’t the same be done for Spyware? There 
are many good reasons why this should happen. Spyware programs, 
especially those that are more deceptive in nature, require experts to 
understand their operation and removal. Experts also have the benefit 
of larger resources and experience, and can make more informed 
decisions on what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ based on much better data than 
that available to most users. 
 Ignoring the technical complications with such an approach, 
spyware has proven to be a much more complicated problem to 
eradicate because its definition often turns on the level of user control 
or “consent” over the software’s operation. A majority of computers 
and most new computers come with some form of Anti-Spyware/Anti-
Virus tool, yet spyware remains a large problem. 
 First there is the issue of how exactly the Anti-Spyware programs 
operate. Methods of detection, criteria for flagging, and underlying 
motivations for detection, all present important questions. 
 There are many Anti-Spyware applications. Generally, they use 
different detection schemes, different criteria, and even different 
methods of flagging software. Because the specifics of an anti-
spyware program’s operation is generally not public, there are some 
who question the motivations of the anti-spyware vendors. Recently, 
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companies such as Microsoft have come under fire for changing how 
they flag certain programs. The argument is that because these criteria 
are not standard and open, there is always a risk that companies may 
choose what to flag and not to flag based not on customers’ best 
interest, but that of the anti-spyware vendor.   The ASC documents 
described above in conjunction with the ASC “Vendor Dispute and 
False Positive Resolution” document, provide some understanding of 
how anti-spyware vendors make decisions about what software to 
block or label and provide procedural protections to software vendors 
who believe they have been unfairly dealt with.  
 In addition to suspicion from some consumer activists, anti-
spyware companies also routinely come under fire from vendors that 
they tag as spyware as well. Some vendors have even filed lawsuits, 
and used other methods to push anti-spyware vendors to re-evaluate or 
downgrade their products. While well defined criteria may help 
alleviate this problem, the ultimate decision is up to the consumer. If 
consumers are provided an adequate means of evaluating the criteria 
for themselves, then the anti-spyware vendor has a much easier job 
concentrating on removing items that are clearly bad, and passing the 
hard, context dependent, decisions on software in the grey areas to 
consumers themselves.  
  At present, there are two major weaknesses that prevent anti-
spyware tools from forming a complete solution.  First, the tools 
themselves are incapable of catching or removing all known spyware 
(let alone unknown spyware).  Second, the tools are not (and perhaps 
cannot be) sophisticated enough to understand a given user’s trade-
offs between privacy, system performance, security and the 
functionality enabled by a product.  While limiting the scope in which 
the tool is deployed can limit the choices users will have to make 
(corporate environment vs. consumer machine), even if the tool can 
identify a potential privacy or security threat, it is necessary in many 
cases to present that threat to the user for the final decision about 
installation.   
 Currently, the burden of informing the users falls on the EULA. 
For these reasons, in addition to good software tools and operating 
system design, it is important that we consider what user interface 
design methods in conjunction with what legal reforms could improve 
the current state of software disclosures and ultimately improve an end 
users ability to successfully manage their computer environment. 
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D.  PRIVACY ATTITUDES AND USER BEHAVIOR 
 Consumers often lack knowledge about risks and modes of 
technical and legal protection [3]. For example, a recent AOL/NSCA 
study showed that users are unaware of the amount of spyware 
installed on their computers and its origin [5]. A related study on the 
use of filesharing clients shows that users are often unaware that they 
are sharing sensitive information with other users [23]. 
 Users also differ in their level of privacy sensitivity. Westin [6] 
found that consumers fall generally into one of three categories: 
privacy fundamentalists, privacy pragmatists, and the marginally 
concerned. Other research shows that the pragmatic group’s attitudes 
differ towards the collection of personally identifying information and 
information to create non-identifying user profiles [23] and can be 
distinguished with respect to concern towards offline and online 
identity [3]. Users also show great concern towards bundling practices 
and the involvement of third parties in a transaction [3][12]. 
 Experimental research demonstrates that user behavior does not 
always align with stated privacy preferences [3][23]. Users are willing 
to trade off their privacy and/or security for small monetary gains 
(e.g., a free program) or product recommendations [3][23]. Moreover, 
Acquisti and Grossklags [3] report evidence that users are more likely 
to discount future privacy/security losses if presented with an 
immediate discount on a product. Consumers may also accept offers 
more often when benefits and costs are difficult to compare and 
descriptions are provided in ambiguous and uncertain terms [4]. 
E.  ONLINE PRIVACY NOTICES 
 EULAs, ToS, and some privacy policies present complex legal 
information. Research shows, however, that complexity of notices 
hampers users’ ability to understand such agreements. For example, 
Jensen and Pott [15] studied a sample of 64 privacy policies from high 
traffic and health care websites. They found that policies’ format, 
location on the website and legal content severely limit users’ ability 
to make informed decisions. 
 One attempt to improve users’ ability to make informed decisions 
is the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [23]. Under this 
standard, websites’ policies are expressed in a predefined grammar 
and vocabulary. Ackerman and Cranor [2] explored ways to provide 
user assistance in negotiating privacy policies using semi-autonomous 
agents to interact with P3P enabled sites. Another system [11] 
encourages users to create several P3P-enabled identity profiles to 
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address information usage patterns and privacy concerns for different 
types of online interactions. However, [25] Vila et al. raise the 
question of whether users will ever be bothered to believe or read 
privacy policies at all. They claim that because the cost of lying in a 
privacy policy is low, and that some of the privacy policies are not 
trustworthy, users do not feel it is worth their time to read them or pay 
attention to them at all. The fact that EULAs can change their terms at 
will further reduce users incentive to pay attention to them.  
F.  MULTI-LAYERED NOTICES  
 Research on product labeling and hazard warnings (see, for 
example, [21]) focuses on improving the efficiency of consumer 
notification.11 This research has influenced the formulation of different 
methods for presenting notice to the end user. For example, 
researchers from the Center for Information Policy Leadership call for 
statements in short, everyday language that are available in a common 
easy-to-read format12. However, they also caution that legal 
requirements require companies to provide complete notices that do 
not fit this standard (see, for example, [1]). They propose a multi-
layered notice with a minimum of two notices that first provide a 
summary at the top level, increasing detail at the lower layers, and the 
complete, detailed notice as a final layer. The layering should include 
a short notice (also called condensed notice or highlights) that 
provides the most important information in a consistent format, 
including the parties involved, contact information, and the type of 
data collected, and the uses for which it is intended.  
 There is varying governmental support for layered notices. For 
example, the European Union has taken concrete steps towards a 
 
 
 
 
11 The debate over labeling and notice is also taking place in the area of Digital Rights 
Management (DRM). DRM systems limit a consumer’s ability to share copyright protected 
content through digital media software and hardware features. Users implicitly agree to these 
limits when purchasing DRM equipped products. Some consumer advocates believe this kind 
of implicit notice is not adequate to alert consumers to the reduced functionality of the product 
they are purchasing. In 2003 Reps Boucher (D-VA), Lofgren (D-CA) and Brownback (R-KS) 
introduced the Consumers, Schools and Libraries Digital Rights Management Awareness Act 
which attempted to increase consumer DRM rights. 
12 P3P clearly shares the same goals, however, with a somewhat complementary solution 
process. 
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layered notice model.13 In the United States, the Department of Health 
and Human Services has encouraged entities covered by the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to prepare such 
notices [20]. In addition, currently proposed Spyware legislation asks 
that companies provide notices in an easy to process format. However, 
despite public consideration14, there is no broad consensus for the 
financial industry pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [1]. 
G.  HCI AND DESIGN ISSUES 
 Our research shows that software EULAs are not an effective 
mechanism for conveying information to end users. Through 
interfaces that, increase awareness of significant issues, we may create 
greater potential for informed consent.  However, HCI is only a partial 
solution. 
 The challenge of attracting attention to important events is not a 
new one in HCI.  A number of researchers are studying the effects of 
notification systems in computing.  Examples of systems include 
instant messaging, user status updates, email alerts, and news and 
stock tickers.  This research examines the nature of interruptions and 
people’s cognitive responses to work-disruptive influences. 
Notification systems commonly use visualization techniques to 
increase information availability while limiting loss of users’ focus on 
primary tasks [6][14][27]. From control room and cockpit indicators to 
desktop notifiers, substantial research has been devoted to identifying 
visual and auditory displays that attract attention and to designing 
interaction sequences that prevent automatic dismissal of information.   
 As a trivial example, it is now somewhat common to prohibit the 
use of an "Agree" button until after the user has viewed the entire 
agreement.  Of course, scrolling to the end of the agreement defeats 
that simple intervention. 
 
 
 
 
13 Article 29 Data Working Party, “Opinion on More Harmonised Information Provisions,” 
http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/eu/gruppe29/wp100/wp100_en.pdf.  The Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party is an independent advisory body set up under Article 29 of 
Directive 95/46/EC, and it outlined this approach. 
14 See Federal Trade Commission.  Getting noticed: writing effective financial privacy 
notices.  http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/getnoticed.pdf. (notes from a public 
workshop discussing how to provide effective notice under the GLB Act: Get Noticed: 
Effective Financial Privacy Notices, (Dec. 4 2001)).   
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 If the particularly relevant terms or conditions of a EULA can be 
identified, it is possible to summarize them in a short, easy-to-read 
form.  If standardized agreements are designed, it is possible to 
highlight only unusual terms. For example, the European Union’s 
approach to consumer protection in standard mass-market consumer 
contracts, such as EULAs, pursues a mixture of standard terms and 
construction presumptions against non-standard terms.  Below we 
experiment with interfaces that use such a design to determine how 
effectively they can change user actions and user satisfaction with 
their software installation decisions.   
 Given the variety of individual preferences, it may be necessary to 
develop a profile of preferences (much like P3P for web-based 
privacy) to alert users to cases where an agreement or a software 
system may be traversing their usual preferences.  The success of any 
such notification system depends upon both the reliability with which 
such determinations can be made and the number of false positives—
the number of alerts that the user chooses to dismiss rather than honor.  
We have all become accustomed to web browser alerts (e.g., for 
moving from a secure to insecure site) that are not sufficiently valued 
and are therefore turned off. 
 In sum, user interface design alone will not afford end users with 
adequate information and control over software behavior.  While the 
lessons of HCI can help inform the presentation of information to 
users, the technical and legal underpinnings are essential to avoid 
carefully presenting the user with little more than noise, or worse, 
creating a “usable” privacy or security solution in which users can 
simply, efficiently, and more knowingly undermine their privacy, 
security, or other interests. 
III.  SOLUTION GRAPHS 
 We refer to the ideas in this section as solution graphs because 
they flow from the analysis illustrated in figure 1.  The goal of this 
section is to identify a set of partial solutions, and to identify a set of 
research questions that can help inform us as we pursue these 
questions.   
 Spyware is not a clean category, but rather a fuzzy one.  
Nonetheless, for some set of spyware, it may be that an authority 
determines that it should be prohibited.  That authority may be legal 
(e.g., banning the transmission of Social Security numbers through 
such software), or more likely organizational (e.g., a company 
determining that any software in certain categories is banned).  The 
first solution graph, therefore, is a legal/technical one.  If the authority 
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is governmental, such software may be prohibited by law.  Whether 
governmental or organizational, such software may be prevented or 
removed by anti-spyware tools.  This solution bypasses the entire 
question of informed consent by declaring that the user’s opinion of 
the software is inconsequential.  
 If the software is not banned or blocked, then the decision of 
whether to install it should be left to the user.  One would hope for an 
honest and accurate disclosure of the functioning of the software; 
however the current state of consumer protection law creates perverse 
incentives that can discourage disclosure. An inaccurate disclosure is 
more likely to create liability than a lack of disclosure. Therefore 
entities that provide more detailed notices and explicit promises to 
consumers risk faces greater legal exposure for divergent practices 
than those who remain silent. Today there is a lack of incentive to 
provide complete and accurate disclosures.  There is growing pressure 
on spyware companies, particularly adware companies, to use EULAs 
to describe software behavior. While these incentives may drive 
legitimate businesses they are unlikely to influence the behavior of 
truly egregious actors.   
 Unsurprisingly, given the state of EULAs, users may be skeptical 
of company disclosures and turn to trusted third parties such as anti-
spyware companies to assess the software’s behavior.  One could 
imagine a light weight service that served a Consumer Reports 
function, rating or scoring software to summarize their assessment of 
the risks and trade-offs involved in its installation and use. 
 Assuming, for purposes of this section, there is a full and accurate 
disclosure, the next question is whether there is a meeting of the 
minds—informed consent. As we show below and others have shown 
before, EULAs are not well suited to provide information to users or 
to aiding user comprehension.  There exist several challenges to 
informed consent: 1) the consent process appears as an obstacle on the 
way to a task; 2) the length and language of documents used to convey 
information to users; and 3) the triviality of the consent mechanisms 
employed (“I agree”).  Consider spyware installed with a game 
downloaded from a web site.  The user eager to play this game is 
unlikely to break concentration from the task to give serious time and 
consideration to the consequences, particularly if doing so requires 
reading a multi page document containing dense legal and technical 
language.  One solution to this dilemma would be to delay 
gratification—if software installation did not take effect for some 
period of time then users might have time to reconsider their actions.  
This "cold shower" approach has been incorporated in law to protect 
consumers in potentially high-pressure, high-stakes contexts (such as 
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in-home sales).  Early results in computer-based education show some 
promise:  when users were not allowed to respond immediately to 
questions their answers improved.   
 
Figure 1:   Graph of possible solutions to spyware problem 
 Since most users are unlikely to agree to a waiting period before 
software installation, the remaining choices are all about the user 
interface.  Here, there have been two directions.  Persuasive 
approaches have been used to elicit a predefined correct answer more 
often.  For example, warning people that untrusted software can 
damage your computer attempts to elicit a "no" response.  Informative 
approaches can be measured on their effectiveness in getting users to 
give the correct answer, whether that answer is "yes" or "no."  Such 
approaches may include summaries of terms, matches between terms 
and profiles, and even a clear statement of costs and benefits.   
 We argue that the nature of spyware today requires the union of 
these techniques.  Realistically, individual informed consent is an 
attention- and effort-intensive process.  Individuals need the backup of 
legal infrastructure to prohibit the most egregious offenses, to force 
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the honest disclosure of terms and effects, and to protect them against 
over-reaching and unconscionable terms.  Technology can help 
enforce preferences when they can be accurately expressed and their 
violation detected.  External agencies can help by providing ratings of 
risk and quality.  But in the end, users must have the control to make 
certain decisions about trade-offs between their privacy, their security, 
their attention, and the services or products they desire.   
 In the rest of this paper, we describe an experiment on different 
notice conditions, describe the results, and explore a set of questions to 
help us along the way towards an environment in which meaningful, 
informed consent is more likely to be achieved. 
IV.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 We conducted a study in which participants were being observed 
while they considered installing five real world applications. Our goal 
was to examine the factors that contribute to users’ application choices 
when those programs exhibit behaviors that can harm their 
information privacy, computer security, and system performance. In 
particular, we aimed to understand what impact currently implemented 
and proposed warnings and notices have on users’ installation 
decisions of potentially harmful software and their knowledge of 
likely privacy and security consequences.  
 The goals of our investigation required us to study not only 
quantitative data about installation frequencies but also qualitative data 
about subjects’ impressions of the programs under consideration close 
to decision time. We, therefore, opted for direct observation of each 
individual followed by an in-depth interview process that also 
included brief surveys on attitudes towards program behaviors and 
individuals’ knowledge with respect to computer configuration tasks. 
 Alternative study designs would have allowed for collection of 
different types of data. 
 One alternative design would be to record users’ actions on their 
own machines over some period of time and ask users questions about 
the types of programs they installed.  However, this approach is error-
prone, as it depends upon users correctly remembering and 
commenting on their actions.  
 A long-term log or a one-time audit of user machines, as 
conducted in the Earthlink spyware study [12], would have permitted 
us to record the number of potentially harmful programs on users’ 
computers. However, it would not have provided a way to study 
individuals’ behavior during the program selection and installation 
process.  
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 To gain a better understanding of users’ behavior, we needed to 
observe the process and ask the users questions immediately after the 
experiment was performed. While the trade-off of this approach is 
fewer users than a survey or audit study, the advantages of the study 
approach is that we were able to obtain sufficient data, observe all 
interactions with the software, gather qualitative data about the 
decision-making process during and after installation, and maintain 
consistency across subjects.  
 A drawback of our approach is the small number of participants 
that limits our ability to present statistically robust results. However, 
we believe that our exploratory study helps to provide a good 
overview of the multi-dimensional information gathering and choice 
process of individuals that would not have been possible with a more 
constrained study methodology. We suggest that our study provides 
enough data to inform and guide our further experimentation into user 
behavior and notice design. 
A.  EXPERIMENT CONSTRUCTION 
1.  APPLICATIONS USED IN THE EXPERIMENT 
As part of our study, we selected five applications that users could 
download.  Each contained bundled software or functionality that 
monitored user’s actions or displayed adds.  The criteria we used in 
selecting our programs were:   
1. The program must have a legitimate and desirable function;  
2. The program must have some type of bundled functionality 
that could be averse to a given user’s privacy/security 
preferences; and  
3. Programs must display a notice of terms (EULA, ToS/ToU) 
that aim to contractually bind the user upon installation.    
We chose the following programs: 
• KaZaA –  “A peer-to-peer file-sharing program that 
allows you to share and download media files from 
other users.” 
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• Edonkey – “A peer-to-peer file-sharing program that 
allows you to share and download media files from 
other users.” 
• Webshots – “This program provides a variety of 
ways to use photos for your computer desktop as 
wallpaper and screensavers.” 
• Weatherscope – “A program that displays your 
current local temperature whenever you are online.  
It provides one-click access to 3-day and 7-day 
forecasts.” 
• Google Toolbar – “A program that allows you to 
search the web from any web site, eliminate pop-up 
ads and fill in forms with one click.” 
 We wanted the programs to reflect the range of behavior and 
functionalities that users encounter while installing applications in the 
real world. We selected some programs that had explicit opt-out 
options (e.g., Google Toolbar and Edonkey) and some that lacked such 
options (e.g., KaZaA and Weatherscope). In addition, we included 
programs that bundled multiple seemingly unrelated applications (e.g., 
KaZaA) and a program that likely does not bundle additional software 
or functionality (e.g., Webshots).  
 During our selection process we aimed to include programs with 
different brand reputation. For this reason, we chose a program from a 
brand with a positive association, such as Google. Other programs in 
our study received substantial negative press, such as KaZaA.  
 Importantly, while these applications include or bundle program 
behaviors that may conflict with users’ privacy and security 
preferences, we did not suggest to participants that any of them 
contain spyware.  Perception concerning each programs’ behaviors, 
and disclosure and consent procedures often decide whether a program 
is considered spyware or not, both by end users and by anti-spyware 
vendors.  Therefore, our research intentionally included software that 
users would unlikely consider to be spyware or even intrusive (e.g., 
Google Toolbar).  
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 2.  EXPERIMENT SCENARIO   
 In order to motivate our users to make a decision to install or not 
install a given program, we created a scenario for users to follow. We 
wanted to provide users with a reason to consider installing some or all 
of the programs, but we also wanted to ensure that they were not 
obligated to install any of them.  We thus presented the user with the 
following situational description: 
 Imagine that a friend (or relative) has asked you to help set up this 
computer.  The computer already has the most popular office 
applications installed. Your friend wants additional functionality and 
is considering installing other software.  
 Here is a quote from your friend:  “Here are some programs that 
were recommended to me by my friends.  Since you know more about 
computers than me, can you install the ones you think are 
appropriate?”  
 The five program executables were located on the desktop of the 
computer used by the participants. The displayed name of the 
executables as well as the study instructions did not reveal the 
programs’ brands or names. They were referred to as Program A, B, C, 
D and E. Subjects, however, received basic descriptions of the 
programs below the printed scenario description in the instructions. 
For example, we described KaZaA and EDonkey as: “Program A (or 
E) - A peer-to-peer file-sharing program that allows you to share and 
download media files from other users.” For each study subject we 
randomized the arrangement of the programs in the instructions and on 
the desktop to avoid order effects. 
 If users decided to install a program, they could double click on 
the program’s installation icon which started each program’s standard 
installation routine. They could decide at any time to cancel the 
installation and go on to the next program.  
3.  NOTICE CONDITIONS 
 We wished to examine whether different types of notices would 
affect a user’s decision to install a program.  We were also interested 
in capturing if users were aware of each type of notice, and their recall 
of the notice after installation.  We chose three different types of 
notices.  Below we describe the characteristics of each notice 
condition. 
 
Notice Condition 1 - EULA Only:  The first notice condition is a 
control treatment consisting of only the original EULAs and notices 
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that are included in each program.  This notice condition represents 
what most users would see when they install a program downloaded 
from the internet. 
 
Figure 2: EULA for Webshots 
Notice Condition 2 - Microsoft SP2 Short Notice + EULA:  In 
addition to the EULA included in each individual program, the second 
notice condition includes a short warning from Microsoft that is 
displayed when users begin the installation. This warning is included 
with Windows XP Service Pack 2, and is provided for all programs 
that are downloaded from the web. If available, the notification 
includes a link to the publisher information as well as links to privacy 
policy information.  The purpose of this notice condition is to test if a 
commonplace heightened-notice practice, active by default, will affect 
installation behavior. 
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Figure 3: Microsoft Windows XP SP2 Warning 
 Notice Condition 3 - Customized Short Notice + EULA:  The third 
notice condition consists of a layered notice: a customized short notice 
in addition to the EULA included in each individual program.  In this 
notice condition, the short Microsoft warnings shown in notice 
condition 2 were disabled.  Users were instead presented with a 
window that provides specific information about each program (see 
Figure 3).  When users reached the portion of the installation program 
that showed the EULA, this window appeared in the forefront of the 
EULA automatically. We describe how we decided on the content and 
presentation of these short notices in more detail below. 
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Figure 4: WeatherScope Customized Short Notice 
4.  CREATING THE SHORT NOTICES 
 As noted above, there exists considerable legal and computer 
security literature that deals with short notices.  The actual content that 
a short notice should contain is slightly different in each proposal, but 
they all recommend that the most relevant information should be 
presented clearly and concisely.  The EU model suggests that the 
condensed notice should contain all the relevant information to ensure 
people are well-informed about their rights and choices.15  The key 
points of a short notice are that they should use language and layout 
that are easy to understand, and they should include: 
 
 
 
 
15 Article 29 Data Working Party, “Opinion on More Harmonised Information Provision,” 
http://www.datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/eu/gruppe29/wp100/wp100_en.pdf. 
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• The name of the company 
• The purpose of the data processing  
• The recipients or categories of recipients of the data 
• Whether replies to questions are obligatory or 
voluntary, as well as the possible consequences of 
failure to reply 
• The possibility of transfer to third parties 
• The right to access, to rectify, and oppose 
 The purpose of our study is neither to create a new standard for 
short notices, nor to evaluate the effectiveness of various language 
terms.  Rather, our goal is to determine if any short notice would have 
an effect on a user’s installation decisions.  For this reason, we chose 
to emphasize the aspects of a EULA that were consistent with users’ 
expressed privacy/security preferences, such as items describing third 
party access to information and the impact on machine performance 
(slow down, crashing, popups, etc.). We borrowed heavily from 
existing recommendations when appropriate, using a simple layout, 
bullet points, and easy to understand language. We created a series of 
four generic privacy/security questions, which we answered for each 
program in the notice.  An example short notice is shown in Figure 4. 
 We derived the content for each short notice by examining the 
TOS and EULA for each program, and answered each of the four 
questions described below using consistent language across notices.  
Our aim was to include information that those skilled in the art would 
know or be able to infer about the program by installing it.  
 We aimed to answer the following questions in a consistent 
fashion across programs: 
• What information is collected?  The purpose of 
this question is to describe in common language 
what information is being collected by the program. 
This is in keeping with the proposals of the EU and 
P3P notices. 
• How is this information collected?  The purpose of 
this question is to inform users how the information 
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above will be collected by the program being 
installed and all of its additional components. 
• How is this information used?  The purpose of this 
question is to provide information to users about 
how the program and its additional components will 
use the information collected (above). If information 
is given to third-parties, such would be noted here. 
• How does this installation affect your computer?  
Users are often concerned about system 
performance issues that may arise when they are 
installing new software. In many cases, this may be 
the most important factor in deciding whether to 
install a program. Measuring operating system 
impact in relation to other programs the user may 
have already installed and their current 
configuration is non-trivial. Ideally, it would be nice 
to say “the computer will be 25% slower” or “it will 
take an extra couple of minutes to perform common 
tasks,” yet the complexities and unknowns of 
various configurations makes it difficult to do so.  
We instead opted for an approach that would 
educate users about the possible consequence of 
installing additional programs. For this reason, we 
chose to tell users the number of programs they were 
installing, and that additional programs could cause 
the computer to behave more unreliably and 
possibly slower. 
 Information about uninstalling programs is also important to users. 
However, we chose not to include this in our short descriptions since it 
is difficult to articulate the degree of difficulty to remove a program, 
and we lacked detailed technical information about each individual 
program to determine what is actually removed by uninstalling the 
program. However, we thought it would be valuable to capture user 
capabilities in detecting and uninstalling software using common 
Microsoft Windows tools.  Therefore, we included related questions in 
a post-installation survey.  In future work, we will look more closely at 
user behavior in the uninstall process.  
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5.  SURVEYS AND POST STUDY INTERVIEW 
 During the experimental phase we anticipated users to be 
influenced by a multitude of individual preferences and strategies that 
would contribute to their decisions to gather different degrees of 
information about a program and finally to install or not to install a 
program.  For example, some participants might have a positive prior 
experience with a program, while others are not interested in a 
program’s functionality.  To gain greater insight into these 
unobservable factors and the causes for users’ behaviors, we involved 
each user into a post-experimental standardized open-ended interview 
[18] with two nested one-page paper surveys.  We created an interview 
script with a set of carefully worded questions and transitions as well 
as with a fixed ordering aimed to create a comparable experience for 
all participants.  We indicated opportunities for probing users’ 
responses and included certain suggestions for brief follow-up 
questions in the script.  For treatments 2 and 3, we added a brief 
section to study the specific effects of these treatments but otherwise 
kept the survey unchanged.  We attempted to place this additional 
section so that the perceived difference between the interviews would 
be limited. The interviews were planned to last for an average of 45 
minutes, and actually took between 35 and 60 minutes. 
 We structured the interview into the following sections: 
1. Basic Demographic Information 
2. Reasons for Install/Uninstall of each program 
3. Ask for recommendations how they would change the 
installation process to assist in decision making process 
4. Prior Experience with Programs 
5. Questions about Notice and Contractual Agreements 
(Added specific questions about notice conditions 2 and 3) 
6. First Survey on privacy preferences 
7. Reaction to Short EULAs, determine if they regret the 
decision to install/ not install 
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8. Ask again for recommendations to installation process to 
assist in their decision making process 
9. Second survey on technical capabilities 
10. General comments and feedback to our study 
 Section I included questions about participants’ age and computer 
usage practices. Then, in section II, we studied participants’ reasons 
that motivated them to install or not install each program.  First, for 
each program installed by the participant, we queried for her reasons 
to act in this way, and followed up with a question  asking whether she 
had also considered any factors for not installing the program.  
Second, we continued this section discussing programs that were not 
installed by the participant reversing the order of these two questions.  
In section III we asked whether any (unspecified) factors with respect 
to the installation screens helped users in their choice to install or not, 
succeeded by a generic question whether participants would 
recommend any improvements to those screens to help them with their 
installation decisions. By starting with these very basic questions, in 
sections II and III, we aimed to derive a general understanding about 
participants’ motivational drivers for their program choices before we 
would involve them into a more focused dialogue on the notice 
conditions.  At this point, we expected that participants would more 
likely refer to security concerns in conditions 2 and 3 compared to the 
control condition 1. 
 Section IV investigated participants’ prior knowledge of each 
program: did they hear of it; did they install it themselves; and did 
they actually use it.  Next, in section V, we investigated whether 
participants were aware that by installing a program they entered into 
a contractual agreement with the software producer, whether they 
remembered anything about those agreements, and whether this 
information had any impact on their installation decisions.  At this 
point we also inserted questions about notice conditions 2 and 3. 
 Then, in section VI, we presented participants with a paper survey 
that listed sixteen program features: some being likely undesirable and 
commonly associated with spyware, and others that we considered as 
potentially beneficial. Participants indicated their level of concern with 
those features on a 5-point Likert Scale (with 1: ‘not concerned;’ 5: 
‘extremely concerned’).  In section VII, we asked participants to study 
the short notices for each program.  We requested participants to 
revisit their earlier choices to install or not install each program, and 
what information in the short notices could contribute to change their 
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mind or not.16 We anticipated participants to show different types of 
reaction (e.g., regret or confirmation of their earlier decisions) 
depending on, for example, their prior knowledge of the program and 
their attitudes towards the features listed in the short notices. 
Subsequently, in section VIII, we asked participants to reconsider 
whether they would desire any changes to the installation process of 
the programs provided.  We note that sections II-III and VII-VIII are 
not redundant for notice condition 3, since we could not foresee how 
each participant would react to the short notices during the experiment 
(e.g., some would study them carefully, while others would ignore 
them).  
 In section IX participants were asked to indicate their level of 
comfort and prior experience with thirteen computer maintenance 
practices commonly connected to defending against, and removing 
spyware (e.g., configuring a firewall and editing the Windows 
registry).  The survey format facilitated a response on a 4-point scale 
(ranging from ‘not comfortable at all’ to 'have done this many times;’ 
we also gave participants the option to indicate that they are ‘unsure’).  
We concluded in section X by asking for general comments about our 
study. 
 We should note that the purpose of the nested surveys was not to 
create broad generalizations of the computing public at large. There 
have been many other surveys that have provided excellent data on 
users’ privacy and security preferences. Rather, our surveys were 
included to get a better understanding of our subjects’ capabilities and 
concerns, and to use this information to guide our questions and 
analysis, as well as to tie back our results to the larger research 
community. 
V.  RESULTS 
A.  PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS 
 Our user sample consisted of 31 participants:  14 male and 17 
female university undergraduates assembled by a university recruiting 
service. All used the Windows operating system on their home 
computer, and 24 of them maintained their computer at home 
 
 
 
 
16 For participants that experienced notice condition 3 we mainly expected confirmation of 
their earlier choices. However, at this point we could study which of the practices in the short 
notices were considered harmful or unproblematic. 
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themselves.  14 participants had an age of under 20, 16 were aged 
between 20 and 25. They spent an average of 26 hours a week on their 
home computer (std. dev. of 12), and 2.5 hours a week on work 
computers (std. dev. of 4).  
B.  SURVEY RESULTS 
 The tables below describe the results of the two surveys we 
administered to each user. Table 1a describes the survey we gave to 
users before the task, which concentrated on user concerns. Table 1b 
describes the survey we gave to users after they performed the tasks, 
which concentrated on users capabilities.  From the survey results in 
Table 1a, we saw that our users were mostly concerned with programs 
that gave pop-up advertising, sent personal information, or affected 
their systems performance (crashing, slowing down, etc). Our users 
seemed least concerned about monitoring behavior that the program 
would use to provide updates or assist in diagnostics of software 
problems. Finally, our users indicated that they were mildly concerned 
about monitoring their actions on their machines, such as web sites 
visited and programs installed.  
 In terms of their capabilities, our users represented more 
sophisticated computer users. While this was most likely the result of 
the sample we had (late teen, college undergraduates who spent on 
average 26 hours per week on their home machines). It was surprising 
how sophisticated they were since none of the sample were actually 
pursuing a technical degree. To some extent, they represented the 
growing sophistication of the average young computer user. Half of 
the users had changed the value of a registry key at least once, or 
could determine the amount of RAM an application was using as well 
as the amount of CPU time an application consumed. In the post-
interviews we confirmed that they had indeed learned many of these 
techniques from more technical friends in an effort to combat spyware, 
and determine what could be affecting their machine’s performance. 
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Table 1a:  Survey Results of User Concerns 
 
Table 1b:  Survey Results of User Capabilities 
C.  INSTALLATION DECISIONS 
1.  WHAT FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO PARTICIPANTS’ DECISION TO 
INSTALL PROGRAMS? 
 One of the goals of our study was to observe user behavior 
installing programs in a near-natural setting. It allowed us to ask 
Questions
1 - not 
concerned
2 - minimally 
concerned
3 - moderately 
concerned
4 - very 
concerned
5 - extremely 
concerned Mean Median Mode STDDEV
This program collects the title and web address of the websites 
you visit. 10% 23% 29% 32% 6% 3.03 3 4 1.11
This program collects information about what software is 
present on your computer. 3% 23% 32% 29% 13% 3.26 3 3 1.06
This program collects your first name, city, ZIP code, country 
and time zone. 3% 3% 19% 29% 45% 4.10 4 5 1.04
This program collects information about when the program 
crashes and this information is reported to the company to 
prevent crashes from happening in the future. 52% 23% 16% 3% 6% 1.90 1 1 1.19
The information is collected whenever you use your web 
browser to build a profile of your browsing behavior. 6% 19% 35% 16% 23% 3.29 3 3 1.22
The information collected is used to display advertising on your 
computer. 3% 13% 6% 29% 48% 4.06 4 5 1.18
This program keeps track of your computer memory usage and 
makes an automatic backup of your data if your computer is  
likely to crash. 32% 26% 29% 3% 10% 2.32 2 1 1.25
The information collected is used to create general statistics, 
not linked to your identity. 35% 48% 10% 6% 0% 1.87 2 2 0.85
The information collected is used to create a profile linked to 
your identity. 0% 0% 16% 35% 48% 4.32 4 5 0.75
This program will cause your computer to slow down. 0% 3% 16% 19% 61% 4.39 5 5 0.88
This program will cause your computer to crash. 0% 0% 0% 3% 97% 4.97 5 5 0.18
This program will prompt you to install updates to the program 
when they are available. 35% 32% 26% 3% 3% 2.06 2 1 1.03
This program updates itself automatically and without notice. 13% 19% 35% 23% 10% 2.97 3 3 1.17
This program will automatically add other programs to your 
computer without asking you. 0% 0% 0% 23% 77% 4.77 5 5 0.43
This program can be un-installed using the add/remove 
programs feature that comes with Windows. 65% 6% 13% 10% 6% 1.87 1 1 1.34
This program can only be un-installed manually. 29% 23% 16% 13% 19% 2.71 2 1 1.51
Questions
1 - I have 
done this 
many times
2 - I have 
done this at 
least once 5 - Not sure Mean Median Mode STDDEV
Changing the value of a registry key 43% 7% 30% 2.83 2.50 1.00 1.80
Creating backups of your files 20% 20% 0% 2.60 3.00 3.00 1.04
Configuring an anti-virus program 30% 13% 0% 2.60 3.00 4.00 1.25
Configuring a firewall program 30% 17% 0% 2.60 3.00 4.00 1.28
Reinstalling the operating system 40% 17% 7% 2.40 2.00 1.00 1.40
Configuring security settings on your internet browser 30% 13% 0% 2.60 3.00 4.00 1.25
Remove programs from your computer 50% 0% 0% 2.50 2.50 4.00 1.53
Determining what tasks are running on your computer 40% 3% 0% 2.63 3.00 4.00 1.43
Finding files on your computer using windows explorer 23% 17% 0% 2.70 3.00 4.00 1.34
Determining what programs are installed on your computer 33% 10% 0% 2.57 3.00 4.00 1.43
Changing attributes of files and folder 20% 17% 13% 2.97 3.50 4.00 1.50
Determining how much RAM your computer is using 40% 10% 3% 2.37 2.50 1.00 1.30
Determining how much processor time an application is using 30% 20% 10% 2.53 2.50 1.00 1.33
3% 17%
40% 20%
23% 33%
17% 37%
13% 23%
23% 33%
0% 50%
10% 47%
13% 43%
10% 43%
27% 13%
3 - I have never 
done this but 
would be 
comfortable trying 
4 - I’m not 
comfortable and 
would ask 
someone to help
10% 37%
27% 20%
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questions about their motivations and actions. We observed whether 
users paid attention to EULAs, and if so, what particular information 
they obtained or sought. Other factors we examined are why 
participants installed programs, and what process they followed. We 
discovered that our participants shared general concerns about what is 
installed and the effect it has on their computer. Participants varied 
widely in their installation procedures. 
2.  INSTALL PROCESS 
 Participants’ reasons for installing programs varied. Some 
participants only installed applications that they felt comfortable with. 
Other participants installed everything with the intention of checking 
out unknown programs and uninstalling them later.  The following 
categories demonstrate some of the main strategies we observed (we 
note that we do not consider this to be an exhaustive list of all possible 
user motivations or to be representative of the general population):  
• Install first, ask questions later: These participants 
generally installed all programs at once, with the 
intention of examining them in greater detail later. 
They tended to consider themselves computer savvy, 
with the ability to remove or configure programs 
after installation to avoid adverse affects to their 
machine. They felt sufficiently familiar with the 
installation process and tended to click through each 
screen very quickly. 
• Once Bitten, Twice Shy: These participants were 
somewhat computer savvy, but they were influenced 
by past negative experiences. One participant had 
recently been a victim of a phishing attack, while 
another had a program “totally cripple” her laptop. 
They have had past computers crash or become 
inoperable because of rogue programs or viruses and 
often lost data These users tended to be overly 
cautious, and they chose to install applications only 
if they felt those applications were absolutely 
required. They typically skimmed EULAs and 
programs’ information for key phrases such as 
“ads,” “GAIN,” or “popups” to avoid choices that 
would potentially be harmful.  
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• Curious, feature-based: These participants were 
primarily interested in potentially new and 
interesting features delivered by the selection of 
programs. They would only install an application if 
it was popular or offered something that they would 
want or need. These users would typically install a 
program such as WeatherScope because they 
thought it was “cool” and “useful”. 
• Computer-Phobic: These participants were 
generally wary of anything that had to do with 
installing programs or configuring a computer. They 
sought assistance from their friends or other experts 
when they had problems, and they would generally 
request help with any install.  One participant 
mentioned that her father was a savvy computer user 
and “passed on paranoia” to her. They were 
generally very concerned with any warning that 
popped up, and were reluctant to install anything. 
3.  INSTALLATION CONCERNS 
1. Our participants shared a range of common concerns about 
installing software that we gathered in our post-installation 
interview sessions. In the interviews, we asked open-ended 
questions about their concerns with each application. We 
categorized these, and listed them below in order of 
importance: 
2. Functionality (>80%) – A large majority of participants who 
expressed some form of concern were primarily interested in 
the functionality of the application. By functionality, they 
mean convenience, lack of other alternatives, its “cool 
factor” (direct quote) and its purpose. Participants were most 
interested in programs that are “necessary,” “helpful,” or 
“convenient, easy to use” and would add some “aesthetics.”  
3. Popups (~60%) – Popup advertising was the second largest 
concern out of our participants, across all categories of users.  
Many users had strong reactions to them.  “I hate them!” 
was a reaction echoed by several participants.  Many were 
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extremely reluctant to install a program that had popup 
advertising or seemed like it would.  One participant stopped 
an installation after she saw the word “GAIN,” which 
reminded her of Gator, a company that had put advertising 
on her machine before. 
4. Crashing their machine, computer performance (~30%) – 
Some participants were worried that programs would crash 
their machine, take up space, or cause their machine to be 
unstable. This was especially a concern with the ‘Once 
Bitten, Twice Shy’ participants. 
5. Installing additional software (~15%) – Participants were 
concerned about software that installed additional programs.  
“I don’t want a lot of junk on my computer” remarked one 
user.  “Junk” was classified as additional programs that ran 
in the background, that changed homepages, slowed the 
machine, caused it to crash and/or served ads. 
6. Monetary cost (~10%) – Some users were concerned that 
they may be eventually charged later for software they 
installed, even though they did not enter any credit card 
information. 
7. Sends information (<5%) – Our participants never directly 
mentioned privacy concerns as a reason to not install a 
program, but several mentioned that they would be wary of 
programs that collected personal information because they 
thought it would lead to spam or more ads on their machine. 
They referred to personally identifiable information such as 
email addresses.  
4.  WHAT DID USERS INSTALL? 
 We were interested what effect notice had on users installing 
programs.  As discussed above, we ran three notice conditions on 31 
subjects.  We observed their behavior and asked them questions about 
their actions.  A breakdown of subjects is included in Table 2. 
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 Number of Subjects 
Control (EULA Only) 10 
Generic Microsoft + EULA 10 
Short Notice + EULA 11 
Total 31 
 
Table 2: Breakdown of subjects by notice condition 
 
 Table 2 indicates that additional notice overall (in the form of the 
generic Microsoft warning or the short notice) had only a marginal 
impact on the total number of installations (by ~10%, n.s.).However, 
the post-interview process showed that participants felt better 
informed in the notice condition 3 (short notice).  In the following we 
describe in more detail their reactions to notice condition 2 (generic 
Microsoft notice) and notice condition 3 (short notice). 
 
 Installs by notice 
condition 
Control (EULA only) 36 (72%) 
Generic Microsoft + 
EULA 
31 (62%) 
Short Notice + EULA 35 (63%) 
 
Table 3: Total Installs for per notice condition 
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Table 4: Number of participants that could remember additional 
notices 
 
5. GENERIC MICROSOFT NOTICE + EULA 
 
 Table 4 reproduces the number of participants that could 
remember seeing the generic Microsoft notice (60%), that could 
remember some content of the notice (80% with additional probing) 
and remember that it had some effect on their decision to install 
(40%). Some participants found the generic notices to be useful; 
particularly if the generic warning indicated to users that there was no 
known publisher. One participant stated “Edonkey didn’t look good. 
The notice said ‘unknown publisher’, so I chose not to install it.” 
However, none of the participants clicked on the link that provided 
more information about the publisher if the publisher’s identity was 
known. Several users instinctively clicked through the notices without 
even reading them. When asked if they saw them, they said no, but 
when prompted with a blurred version of the notice they said, for 
example, that they have seen similar notices in the past.  One 
participant mentioned that “it asked you whether or not you wanted to 
download it, [and] gave the company name, info and licensing agent.” 
 
6. SHORT NOTICE + EULA 
 
 Table 4 shows that all participants could remember having seen the 
short notice, and that 91% could remember some details of their 
content. 64% stated that the short notice influenced their decision to 
install the programs. Participants were generally enthusiastic about the 
short notices we created. One user wanted to know where we got it, 
Notice 
condition 
Participants 
who 
remembered 
seeing an 
additional 
notice 
Participants 
who 
remembered 
the content of 
the additional 
notice 
Participants 
for whom the 
notice affected 
their decision 
to install 
Generic 6 of 10 8 of 10 4 of 10 
Short EULA 11 of 11 10 of 11 7 of 11 
Total 17 of 21 18 of 21 11 of 21 
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because he wanted to use it at home. Others remarked that they “were 
amazing,” and that they would “love to see this, it would be really 
awesome!” When further prompted for reasons to use this kind of 
short notices, this participant remarked “I personally wonder how 
many people just install stuff [without thinking], wouldn’t be surprised 
if it was the majority.” Others stated that they used the information in 
the short notices to compare programs and assist their decision. One 
user said “the pop-up windows said the programs were no good, [and 
I] might not have known without them.” 
 Most participants were able to recall parts of the content of the 
short notices as well. They mostly recalled the issues that they were 
most concerned about (e.g., pop-ups and system performance). Several 
users were concerned about information transfers to third-parties, and 
some mentioned that the information in the short notices “surprised 
them.” 
 Despite the positive reactions, some users simply ignored them as 
well. Despite stating in the post-interview that they would like “clear 
and concise” information, they made comments such as, “It is hard to 
say if I would read them [short EULAs] even if you flashed 
IMPORTANT at the top. After the third or fourth one I wouldn’t read 
and it would be easy to skip.” 
7.  WHAT PROGRAMS WERE INSTALLED MOST? 
 For each notice condition we were also interested in what 
programs users installed. We saw that the Google Toolbar was the 
most often installed among all sets, whereas Weatherscope ranked last. 
Main reasons for this effect were brand recognition and prior 
experience. Users mentioned, for example, that Google “was a trusted 
brand name” and that they “thought Google toolbar did a good job at 
blocking popups.”  
 While overall the difference in installations between notice 
conditions was not statistically significant, there was a significant 
difference in installations for Edonkey. Users remarked that Edonkey 
was generally unfamiliar, so any additional notice “spooked” them. In 
addition, as we will discuss in more detail later, in the case where 
users had notices they used these in some cases to compare between 
the two file sharing applications. 
 Weatherscope was rarely installed because it reminded users of a 
similar program called “Weatherbug,” which was universally disliked 
because “it had too many popups” and it “crashed my machine.” Users 
also mentioned that the benefits that are associated with programs such 
as Weatherscope or Weatherbug did not outweigh the higher cost of 
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dealing with popup advertisements. A user remarked “you can go to 
weather.com if you really want to check the weather, and then you 
don’t have to deal with any popups.”  
Installation by Treatment
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Control  (EULA Only) Generic + EULA Short + EULA
Control  (EULA Only) 30% 90% 90% 60% 90%
Generic + EULA 70% 30% 70% 50% 90%
Short + EULA 55% 45% 91% 27% 100%
Kazaa Edonkey* 
(p<.05)
Webshots Weather 
Scope
Google
 
Figure 5:  Graph of Installation by Treatment 
D.  NOTICE TREATMENTS 
1.  DID USERS LOOK AT EULAS? 
 
 Participants generally ignored EULAs. The install first users were 
especially adept at clicking through installation screens extremely 
quickly.  Some users went through this process so quickly that they 
did not even remember clicking through the short notices and the 
Microsoft warnings as they popped up.  One install-first participant 
remarked that “[t]he process is so standard, there is nothing to 
influence [your decision] to install or not. I just use all the default 
options and configure it later if I am going to keep it.” 
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2.  NOTICING NOTICE 
 We categorized whether users had read a notice as not at all, 
skimmed and carefully. Not at all meant that they did not glance at the 
notice and promptly continued to the next screen. Skimmed means that 
they may have passed their mouse over the EULA looking for 
keywords, or used the scrollbar to quickly browse through the 
contents. Carefully means that they actually read some sentences or a 
paragraph, before continuing on. We should note that in no case did 
the users attempt to read through all of the EULAs or even one EULA 
completely. In the case of the Generic Notices, because there was no 
scrolling involved, we only noted if they had read it at all. Cases were 
labeled as N/A if they were not relative to the installation. For 
example, if users quit before they were able to see any notice, or 
decided that they didn’t want to install a program, or the program did 
not contain that feature, they were all marked as N/A and was not 
included in the computation.   
 
 
Table 5 
 
Tota ls C on trol
A verage (E U LA  on ly)
R ead  E U LA
Sk im m ed 37 .89 % 3 8.1 0% 5 0 .00 % 25 .5 8%
C arefu lly 10 .03 % 7 .1 4 % 6 .67 % 16 .2 8%
N ot A t A ll 52 .08 % 5 4.7 6% 4 3 .33 % 58 .1 4%
R ead  Sh ort 
E U LA
Sk im m ed 17 .07 % 17 .0 7%
C arefu lly 60 .98 % 60 .9 8%
N ot A t A ll 21 .95 % 21 .9 5%
R ead  G en eric  
N otice
R ead 41 .03 % 4 1 .03 %
N ot A t A ll 58 .97 % 5 8 .97 %
P rogram
E U LA  +  
G en eric  
N otice
E U LA  +  
S h ort N otice
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 Table 5 shows that the Short Notices were skimmed or carefully 
looked at almost 80% of the time, whereas the standard EULA and 
Generic notice were looked at on average of less than 50% of the time. 
3.  WHEN DID USERS STOP AN INSTALLATION? 
 In addition to data on whether users had read or skimmed an 
article, for 28 of the 31 users we had observational data about their 
actions during the installation process. This data was gathered by 
observing the installation process, and marking when users decided to 
stop an installation. From the graph in Figure 6 and the data in Table 
6, it is apparent that the majority of the users in all treatments would 
complete an installation after they had started it. The most common 
case for not installing an application was either skipping it entirely or 
just opening it briefly before exiting (~15%). Once a user had decided 
to install an application, it was very rare that they would stop. Less 
than 6% total stopped installation at the EULA. In the treatments with 
the short or generic notices, users aborted an installation only 10%  of 
the time.  
 
Table 6 
  
Control Total
(EULA only)
Didn’t Open and Ignored 8.00% 2.50% 10.00% 7.14%
Opened Briefly then Stopped 8.00% 7.50% 4.00% 6.43%
Stopped Before the EULA 0.00% 2.50% 2.00% 1.43%
Stopped at the EULA 8.00% 2.50% 6.00% 5.71%
Stopped at Short Notice N/A N/A 10.00% N/A
Stopped at Generic Notice N/A 10.00% N/A N/A
Stopped after EULA 6.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.14%
Completed Install 70.00% 75.00% 68.00% 70.71%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Installation Process for 28 of the
31 users 
EULA +
Generic 
Notice
EULA +
Short 
Notice
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Figure 6 
4.  FILESHARING AS A “MUST-HAVE” APPLICATION 
 We discovered that among our user population and demographic, 
filesharing was a “must-have” application. Although users typically 
installed only one filesharing application, 23 of the 31 users felt that 
they should have at least one filesharing application. Users mentioned 
that filesharing applications were “very useful” and something that 
“everyone should have.” However, in choosing the filesharing 
application to install, users frequently tried to determine which 
application would be less intrusive on their machine. Some users used 
the short notices to compare filesharing applications, while others 
were influenced by the fact that one was “trusted” (as indicated in the 
generic Microsoft warnings for KaZaA) and the other was “unknown” 
(and therefore less trustworthy). Overall, more users installed eDonkey 
over KaZaA. The primary reason for this decision was a negative 
experience with KaZaA. For example one user complained that “it 
2006] GOOD, ET AL. 323 
 
 
crashed my machine,” “I had to reinstall everything again,” and that 
“it had too many popups.”  
 
Notice condition Didn’t install one 
Filesharing program 
Control 
(EULA Only) 
1 
Generic + EULA 2 
Short notice + EULA 4 
Total 7 
 
Table 7:  Users who didn't install a Filesharing Application 
5.  VAGUE SHORT NOTICES CAN CREATE A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY 
 An interesting find was the higher number of installations for 
KaZaA in the short notice treatment as compared to the control.  
During the post-study interview participants indicated that KaZaA 
“didn’t seem as bad” as Edonkey. The number of users preferring 
KaZaA over Edonkey was especially pronounced in the short notice 
treatment. As discussed above, users typically wanted to install one or 
the other, and used the short notices to compare the programs. 
Edonkey disclosed more about the software’s functionality, and gave 
users the option to opt-out of certain features, and KaZaA did not.  
The short notices that were constructed based on each programs 
disclosure reflected this difference.  Our short notice treatment 
reflected the relative complexity of the two programs. Despite the fact 
that the Edonkey EULA was more friendly to users—disclosing more 
about program functionality and providing users with opportunities to 
reject certain features—the greater complexity was evident in the short 
notice and was viewed by users as unfavorable. Below we list the 
contents of the eDonkey short notice and the KaZaA short notice.  
From the two short notices below, we can see that eDonkey discloses 
more information about what personal information is being collected, 
but that the users have the ability to opt out of this process. KaZaA 
says less about the type of information being collected and does not 
offer an opt out. In this case, providing vague information, which led 
us to create a simpler short notice, created an impression of increased 
security or at least less risk 
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6.  KAZAA AND EDONKEY SHORT NOTICES 
Below we list the actual short notices used to describe each program. 
How the eDonkey Agreement Affects You and Your Computer 
What information is collected? 
• Personally identifiable information like your name. 
• Information about your browser, computer operating 
system and Internet Service Provider. 
• The title and web address of the websites you visit. 
• Information you enter into forms on websites and 
what you clicked on. 
How is this information collected? 
• Information is collected whenever you use your web 
browser (Internet Explorer), whether or not you are 
using eDonkey. 
How is this information used? 
• The information collected is sent to third parties. 
• The information collected is used to display pop-up 
advertising on your computer. 
• The information collected is used to create general 
statistics about all users of the system. 
How does this installation affect your computer? 
• You are installing four programs. Every time you 
install a new program it has the potential to slow 
down your computer, slow down your web 
browsing, and/or cause other programs to crash. 
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• This program will show popup advertising on your 
machine when you browse the web. 
• This program will automatically add new programs 
to your computer without asking you. 
• This program will install a new toolbar in your web 
browser, and change your browser start page. 
How KaZaA Agreement Affects You and Your Computer 
What information is collected? 
• The title and web address of the websites you visit. 
How is this information collected? 
• Information is collected whenever you use your web 
browser (Internet Explorer) whether or not you are 
using KaZaA. 
How is this information used? 
• The information collected is sent to third parties. 
• The information collected is used to display pop-up 
advertising on your computer. 
• The information collected is used to create general 
statistics about all users of the system. 
How does this installation affect your computer? 
• You are installing four programs. Every time you 
install a new program it has the potential to slow 
down your computer, slow down your web 
browsing, and/or cause other programs to crash. 
• This program will show popup advertising when you 
browse the web, whether or not you are using 
KaZaA at that time. 
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• This program will automatically add new programs 
to your computer without asking you. 
• This program will install a new toolbar in your web 
browser, and change your browser start page. 
7.  EULAS AND TOS AS LEGALLY BINDING DOCUMENTS 
 Our participants were generally ambivalent towards the EULAs 
and ToS in the software they installed.  Table 8 shows that while 
almost all participants were aware that they were agreeing to a set of 
terms by installing the software (30 of 31), they were generally unable 
to recall the content of the agreement (only 8 of 31 recalled the 
content), and it rarely influenced their decision to install a program 
(only 6 of 31 mentioned that it influenced them).  The participants 
who did recall contents of the EULA remarked that it was generally 
about information that referred to the software product itself, such as 
“copyright notices,” “company policies,” or  “reverse engineering the 
product or using it for unintended purposes.”  Almost none of the 
participants, including the more computer savvy “[i]nstall first, ask 
questions later” users, had any idea that the content of the EULAs and 
ToS actually discussed applications that would be installed, data that 
would be collected, and companies that would access their data.  There 
seems to be a disconnect between user expectations of EULA content 
and actual EULA content.  One user summed up this confusion by 
stating “They should have notices to show what they are really 
installing on the computer.  They trick you [into] thinking it is just a 
license agreement, [you] hit OK, and then you get an advertising bar 
or a lot of junk!” 
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Notice 
condition 
Participants 
aware that 
the Software 
EULA was a 
contract 
Participants 
who had an 
idea of what the 
agreement 
contained 
Participants for 
whom the EULA 
affected their 
decision to install 
Control 
(EULA only) 
10 of 10 2 of 10 3 of 10 
Generic + 
EULA 
10 of 10 5 of 10 2 of 10 
Short  
+ EULA 
10 of 11 1 of 11 1 of 11 
Total 30 of 31 8 of 31 6 of 31 
 
Table 8: Understanding EULAs as Contracts 
E.  REGRETTING INSTALLATION DECISIONS 
 We were interested to learn whether accurate information about 
software behavior would lead users to change their mind about 
program installations. We showed the short notices to all users at the 
end of the survey to determine whether users read them earlier (this 
applies to the short notice condition only) and if they thought they 
would have influenced their installation decisions (applies to all notice 
conditions). Users were asked to read each of the short notices 
carefully, and to decide whether they would like to reverse their earlier 
decision to install or not to install. This approach allowed us to gauge 
whether individuals regretted their installation decision. Regret or 
disappointment materializes if an earlier decision appears to be flawed 
in retrospect, and/or when the obtained result does not match prior 
expectations [17]. 
 We were interested in examining the relationship between users 
reading or skimming a Short Notice, EULA or Generic warning and 
regret and installation decisions. We broke down possible types of 
regret into these categories: 
1. Users regretted their decision and would uninstall the 
program. 
2. Users regretted their decisions and would install the 
program. 
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3. Users did not regret their decision and would keep the 
program installed. 
4. Users did not regret their decisions and would keep the 
program uninstalled. 
 While it is helpful to look at regret in these terms, we were 
interested in the effect of notice alone, and in coordination with other 
factors, on regret. Therefore we decided to look at the following 
additional factors: 
1. Previous Experience – Users were asked if they had 
previously heard of an application, and if so, whether this 
had influenced their choice to install the program. 
2. Reading a notice – During the installation process, the 
observer recorded whether users had looked at a notice or 
not. 
3. Influence of a notice – After the installation process, users 
were asked if the notice influenced their decision or not. 
4. Stopping an installation – During the installation process, the 
observer noted at what point a user would stop installing a 
given application. 
5. Reasons for installing/not installing – Users were asked after 
completing the installation, their reasons for installing or not 
installing a given program. 
 Overall, we found that regret was highest with Weatherscope and 
the filesharing programs. Users were generally happier with their 
decision to not install these programs after reading our short EULAs. 
Popups, performance issues, and the potential disclosure of private 
information to third parties all contributed to user regret. Some users 
were upset, stating “I didn’t install that!,” while others were surprised 
at the extent of information collection they had agreed to by installing 
and using certain programs. Some users remarked that they would 
remove programs that had popups.  They stated, “if I had known this 
had popups I wouldn’t have installed it.” 
2006] GOOD, ET AL. 329 
 
 
1.  REGRET WITH FILESHARING APPLICATIONS 
 Despite the regret that some users felt for filesharing programs, 
many indicated that they would still install them. One user who 
expressed regret at her decision to install eDonkey said “if all free 
music programs do this, and I can’t find anything better then I’m 
going to install it. For a free photo program it might not be worth it, 
but for free music it is.” Another user added “I really don’t like that it 
adds other software, but I would still keep it because filesharing is 
worth it.” 
2.  REGRET WITH TRUSTED SOURCES 
 In the case of Google Toolbar, the program with the greatest brand 
recognition among our users, the reasons for uninstalling were related 
to performance and space issues, rather than concerns with privacy or 
computer security issues. One user indicated that he “didn’t want 
another thing in [his] browser window” and that [he] liked to keep the 
minimum amount of programs running at any given time. 
3.  REGRET ACROSS NOTICE CONDITIONS 
 We studied the degree of participant regret over an installation 
decision in relation to each notice condition. We expected that users 
would experience less regret when they were better informed (i.e., 
being presented a short notice or a generic Microsoft notice in addition 
to the EULA). In fact, participants verbally indicated that especially 
the short notices had a substantial effect on their decision to install or 
not. Compared to the control notice condition, participants 
experienced regret about 15% less often when presented with either a 
short notice or a generic Microsoft warning. Given the size of the 
study, this effect is not statistically significant; however, we believe it 
merits future consideration. 
 The set of programs in our study included two applications that the 
community of our participants had experienced high regret and low 
regret with. We determined that there were some applications that had 
a high install rate, low regret rate and were generally positively 
commented upon (e.g., Google). Conversely, there were some 
applications that were installed less frequently, had a higher level of 
regret, and were viewed negatively. The applications with low regret 
were Google and Webshots, and those with higher regret were 
Edonkey and Weatherscope. We divided the applications into two 
groups, and examined user regret across each notice condition.  Table 
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9 shows the percent of programs that users regretted versus those that 
they would keep. The total number of programs removed was the net 
of programs that users regretted installing and programs the user 
regretted not installing. This number was then subtracted from the 
total number of installs, and normalized across all programs and 
treatments. From the graph in Figure 7, we can see that regret was 
generally highest in the EULA treatment, and lower and about the 
same for the generic notice and short notice treatment.   
 Google toolbar was the highest trusted application, with 93% of 
users installing it, and 83% of the people deciding to keep it after 
reading the short notice in the post-study interview.  Weatherscope 
was on the other end of the spectrum, with just 47% of the recipients 
choosing to install it overall, and none of the thirty-one users choosing 
to keep it.   
 Figure 7 gives a detailed breakdown of each program installed, and 
illustrates the balance between programs that our users decided to 
keep, and those they decided to remove.  The top half of each bar 
represents the percentage of users who chose to remove the program 
while the bottom half of each bar represents the number of users who 
decided to keep it after being asked to read through each short 
description. Solid colors indicate that all users either kept or removed 
the program. By looking at Figure 7, one can see that users decisions 
to install were generally consistent within each program group across 
all treatments. For example, we can see that in the case of Google, 
roughly 90% of all users across treatments chose to keep the toolbar, 
where as in Weatherscope all users chose to remove it.  
Figure 7:  Programs Removed v. Programs Kept 
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 Regretted 
installing  
Regretted not 
installing 
Control 19 (52%) 2 
Short notice 13 (37%) 2 
Generic notice 11 (35%) 0 
 
Table 9:  Installation Regret per Notice condition (Number of 
installations regretted) 
 
 We found (see table 10) that users in the two notice conditions had 
lower levels of regret compared to the control condition. Results 
between these notice conditions were not statistically significant, but 
supported by participant comments in the post-study interview.  
 
 Low Regret 
Applications 
High Regret 
Applications 
Control 6  13 
Short notice 6 5 
Generic notice 1  9 
 
Table 10:  Regret for “low regret” versus “high regret” 
applications 
 
 We also studied whether the different notice conditions influenced 
users by preventing them from installing applications that were 
deemed “high regret” by the community. 
 Table 11 shows that the number of “high regret” installs is similar 
for both the short and generic notices and 6-7 programs less compared 
to the control case. Participants also installed more programs that the 
community considered “low regret” in the short notice case, but fewer 
programs in the generic case. This may be due to the “warning” rather 
than “informing” character of the generic Microsoft notice that may 
have scared participants away.  
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 Installed “useful” Installed “not 
useful” 
Control 18 15 
Short notice 21 8 
Generic notice 16 9 
 
Table 11:  Installation of “useful” versus “not useful” applications 
F.  PRIOR KNOWLEDGE, READING NOTICE AND REGRET 
 The results from measuring regret seemed to suggest that the 
additional warnings may have had some effect on user behavior. 
Although for the small number of participants we had per treatment, 
there was no statistical significance between treatments for regret. The 
data and post study interviews seemed to suggest that for users who 
did read the shorter notices, they may have had some effect in 
matching or reaffirming their preferences, thereby decreasing 
instances of regret. This seemed contrary to what we had observed.  
As shown in the tables on installation behavior, users generally 
ignored all notices and seemed unlikely to stop an installation once 
they had started it.  The number of regret cases we observed was too 
small to perform statistical analysis on beyond simple descriptive 
statistics. However, we decided to look more closely at anecdotal 
evidence of how regret, prior experience, and reading notices and user 
comments were related to help motivate further studies.  
 Table 12 below summarizes regret by users who had indicated they 
had prior experience with an application or not. In cases where users 
had prior experience with a program, one would expect regret to be 
lower. Because we chose programs that were popular, it is conceivable 
that users had already formed opinions about an application before 
they installed it.  
 In Table 12 we see that overall, users who had prior experience 
with a program did seem to have lower regret (13% and 23% 
compared to 50% for the control). In addition, they seemed to have 
lower regret in each group as well (13% compared to 25% for the 
generic notices, and 23% compared to 50% for the short notices).  
 The next column shows the number of users who expressed regret 
who were also either influenced or not influenced by the notice.  The 
next columns show how many of those users regretted their 
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installation per program. By comparing the grey bands with the bands 
below it, we can see that regret for those unfamiliar with an 
application seems to be higher than those who claim they were 
influenced by prior knowledge of the application. It is interesting to 
note though, that in all cases the incidence of regret for the notice 
treatments is still less than the control. 
 
C o n t r o l 2 4  o f  5 0 8  o f  1 0 1  o f  1 0 4  o f  1 0 6  o f  1 0 5  o f  1 0
( B a s e l i n e ) - 5 0 % - 8 0 % - 1 0 % - 4 0 % - 6 0 % - 5 0 %
1 0  o f  4 5 2  o f  9 0 3  o f  9 5  o f  9 0
- 2 2 % - 2 2 % 0 % - 3 3 % - 5 5 % 0 %
2  o f  1 5 3  o f  9 0 0 1  o f  3 1  o f  3 0
- 1 3 % ( ~ 3 3 % ) 0 % 0 % - 3 3 % - 3 3 % 0 %
8  o f  3 0 6  o f  9 2  o f  6 0 2  o f  6 4  o f  6 0
- 2 6 % ( ~ 6 7 % ) - 3 3 % 0 % - 3 3 % - 6 6 % 0 %
1 6  o f  5 0 5  o f  1 0 2  o f  1 0 2  o f  1 0 3  o f  1 0 4  o f  1 0
- 3 2 % - 5 0 % - 2 0 % - 2 0 % - 3 0 % - 4 0 %
7  o f  3 0 6  o f  1 0 3  o f  6 1  o f  6 0 0 3  o f  6
- 2 3 % - 6 0 % - 5 0 % - 1 6 % 0 % 0 % - 5 0 %
9  o f  2 0 4  o f  1 0 2  o f  4 1  o f  4 2  o f  4 3  o f  4 1  o f  4
- 5 0 % - 4 0 % - 5 0 % - 2 5 % - 5 0 % - 7 5 % - 2 5 %
N o t  i n f lu e n c e d
b y  p r io r
e x p e r i e n c e
N o t  i n f lu e n c e d
b y  p r io r
e x p e r i e n c e
S h o r t  N o t i c e 1 0
In f lu e n c e d  b y
p r io r  e x p e r i e n c e
1 0
G e n e r i c 9
In f lu e n c e d  b y
p r io r  e x p e r i e n c e
#  o f  u s e r s  T o ta l  
i n c id e n c e s  
o f  r e g r e t
O f th e s e u s e r s , t h e # o f t im e s th a t t h e y e x p r e s s e d r e g r e t p e r
p r o g r a m
E d o n k e y G o o g le  
T o o lb a r
K a Z a A W e a t h e r S c o p e W e b S h o t s
 
 
Table 12 
 Below we will quickly summarize some of the additional 
anecdotal findings from our data.  
1.  READING NOTICE AND REGRET 
 We found that participants, who looked at short notices, generally 
had less regret than those who did not, although not by a large margin. 
We noted a similar result with the generic notice treatment.  
2.  INFLUENCE OF PRIOR KNOWLEDGE AND SHORT NOTICE ON REGRET 
 We found that users who indicated that they were influenced by 
both prior knowledge and the short notice were less likely to 
experience regret. In addition, we found that this was the case for 
programs that were both installed and not installed. For example, in 
the case of KaZaA, six users in the short notice condition claimed to 
have heard of KaZaA, and five of them mentioned being influenced by 
their previous experience. In addition, they mentioned that the short 
notice influenced their decision as well. It is interesting to note that of 
the users who did not change their mind in this case (5 out of 6), they 
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were almost evenly split between those who installed KaZaA and 
those who did not (three installed, two did not). This implies that in 
some cases, the short notice is useful in affirming users’ belief or 
experience of  a given product. Looking back at these users responses, 
we discovered that they found the short notices useful, even though 
their offer merely confirmed what the users claimed they already 
knew.  
F.  ANALYZING TRADEOFFS 
 In our study, users were asked to evaluate the P2P filesharing 
programs: KaZaA and Edonkey. P2P programs were largely 
considered a “must have” application by our user population. 
Generally, every user installed at least one, but rarely installed both. 
This leads us to wonder what factors influenced the choice between 
the two programs. Installations of these programs across all treatments 
were roughly split in half (~50% installed KaZaA, ~60% installed 
Edonkey). We found that users considered their previous experience 
with a program(s), referrals from ‘experts’ they know, and/or  other 
means of comparison. We summarize these findings below.  
1.  PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE 
 Our users were more familiar with KaZaA than Edonkey. 92% had 
heard of KaZaA. 82% mentioned that they had prior knowledge or 
experience with KaZaA, which contributed to their decision to install 
it or not. Only 18% mentioned that they had heard of Edonkey, with 
only 11% saying this factor had an effect on their decision to install. 
Users familiar with KaZaA, ranged from people who found it “useful 
to get what I want” to those who had negative associations, “I had it 
and it crashed  my computer. I had to reinstall everything,” and also “I 
had too many popups.” In the case of Edonkey, users who were 
familiar with it commented more on functionality, stating “I can find 
what I want.”  It was interesting to note that if negative reactions alone 
accounted for users’ decisions to install KaZaA, then the installation 
would be less than the 50% we observed. In eight cases, users decided 
to either not even open KaZaA, or terminated the installation 
immediately after opening the program, as opposed to zero cases in 
Edonkey. Users seemed to be employing some criteria, in addition to 
prior experience, so we examined the nature of these comparisons. 
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2.  COMPARISON  
 Users generally relied on several factors to compare programs, 
including the short and generic notices. In the control group, 9 out of 
10 users chose Edonkey, while only 2 of 10 chose KaZaA. In the 
additional notice cases (short and generic), installation of Edonkey 
dropped to roughly the same as KaZaA (4 to 6 installs in the Generic 
case, and 6 to 5 installs in the Short Notice case). In the case of 
Edonkey, with which our user base was less familiar, users exhibited 
more initial caution in installing this program, and relied more heavily 
on other cues during the install process. One user noted, “I didn’t 
know what it was, I saw the unknown program warning and decided 
that I wouldn’t install it.” 3 of the 8 users in the Generic warning 
treatment stopped their installation after seeing the generic warning 
popup, as opposed to 0 in KaZaA, a more familiar program. In the 
short notice case, equal numbers of users stopped at the short notice. 
In post-study questions about installation decisions, we found that 
users tried to use the short notices to compare the features and trade-
offs of the two programs. One common feature among the two 
programs was “popups” and some users mentioned “spyware” in the 
post-study interview. Some users would choose the program that they 
felt was more useful, and rely on tools like Google Toolbar to block 
popups that the program would provide. “[Popups] are a necessary 
evil, but I got [Google Toolbar] to block them so they won’t be 
annoying.” We found that users also used the short notices during the 
post study interview to compare programs when they were asked 
whether they regretted installing the program or not. We found that 
users would use short notices to measure tradeoffs between the two 
programs, and sometimes reverse their decisions about which program 
to install.  
3.  COMMON DISCLOSURE PROBLEM 
 The KaZaA EULA was more vague than the Edonkey EULA. 
Consequently the KaZaA short notice tended to be more vague than 
the Edonkey short notice. We found that when users compared the 
programs as presented in the short notices, they often tried to choose 
the software that would limit their exposure to third party software and 
advertisements, while providing the desired functionality. The 
inconsistency between disclosures in the KaZaA and Edonkey notices 
was magnified by the short notice treatment. This led to a perverse 
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result, where users seeking to limit spyware-like behavior ended up 
choosing the more invasive program. Providing a common means of 
describing the add-ons and attributes each program installs would 
assist users in their comparisons, and help them to make choices more 
closely aligned with their values.  This suggests that in the absence of 
a common set of disclosures, short notices could have the unfortunate 
effect of subverting users efforts to limit their acquisition of spyware.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13 
VI.  COGNITIVE WALKTHROUGH OF CURRENT EULA DESIGN 
A.  WHY ISN’T THE EULA SUFFICIENT? 
 While our experiment shows that additional research on the utility 
of short notices is warranted, EULAs in their current form do little to 
inform users about software functionality. As described above, EULAs 
are frequently the only method used to inform users about program 
functionality. In addition, EULAs are rarely examined or 
acknowledged by users during the installation process. Because they 
performed so poorly, we decided to use a technique in HCI known as a 
cognitive walkthrough to explore the benefits and shortcomings of 
current EULA design. While almost all software products have some 
form of EULA or TOS, they are by no means all equal in content, 
presentation, and deployment. Below we analyze the EULAs 
presented with the software used in our study.  
B.  THE PROBLEMS WITH EULAS 
 EULAs serve a dual purpose of providing users with information 
regarding their choices as well as providing software vendors 
Program Hyperlinks Locations Opt-
Out 
Opt-
In 
Edonkey 2 15 6 1 
Google 
Toolbar 2 9 1 0 
KaZaA 4 78 5 0 
WeatherScope 0 23 0 0 
WebShots 0 6 1 0 
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protection from legal liability. Given their perceived role in contract 
formation, it is important for practitioners, policy-makers, and courts 
to understand the limits of EULAs as a tool for conveying information 
to consumers. Regulating agencies have not created a set of guidelines 
for software EULAs. There is a general perception that EULAs are 
ineffective at least in part because consumers don’t read them. 
Anecdotal evidence supports this impression. For example, one 
software provider included a $1000 cash prize offer in the EULA that 
was displayed during each software installation, it took 4 months and 
3,000 downloads of the software for someone to notice the clause and 
claim the prize [17]. 
1.  ANATOMY OF A EULA 
 Based on previous work and anecdotal evidence, we believed that 
EULAs are ineffective in communicating information to users by 
design. To explore this hypothesis, we decided to categorize and 
analyze the current methods software vendors employ in EULAs to 
inform users. We research aspects of the design that contribute to their 
ineffectiveness.   
 We looked at the software EULAs in the five programs used in our 
study, and focused on features—such as font size, readability, length 
and time to read—considered important in the regulatory efforts 
examining notices discussed above. We looked at additional factors 
such as the number of screens devoted to the EULA during 
installation, the method of presenting the EULA (scroll box, drop 
down, outside link), and options for controlling third party software or 
internal features that displayed advertisements, transmitted user 
information or modified existing settings (such as the homepage). We 
were interested in how users interacted with the EULAs, as well as 
how frequently they noticed or used the various strategies for 
controlling their desktop experience.  
2.  EULAS AND TOS APPEARANCE 
 Our participants found EULAs unhelpful.  They stated that the 
“font was too small,” they were “too long,” and “full of legal mumbo-
jumbo.”  A few users had read parts of EULAs carefully on one 
occasion, but eventually gave up on reading them because they were 
long and confusing.  Our participants had several suggestions about 
how EULA presentations can be improved. Most notably they wanted 
EULAs to be “shorter, easier to read, and in very accessible language.”  
One participant stated that she would like to see something “that 
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would tell you exactly what you want to know. [It would] provide a 
summary first, bold whatever is important, bold what is in the 
software, who is using it, and say if it is safe to download.” 
A.  CURRENT EULA DESIGN 
 In analyzing the five EULAs, we documented common strategies 
for gathering consent and informing users in the program during 
installation. (We believe these are representative of strategies broadly 
employed across the software industry.) In the table below [Table 16], 
we list the strategies as well as their frequency of occurrence for each 
program [Tables 13]. These strategies are described below: 
 
• Scroll Box containing EULA text – Users are 
provided the text of the EULA agreement in a scroll 
box.  
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• Force a choice to move to the next screen – This 
choice can be implied (users are connecting to a 
decision by clicking next) or strict (Users cannot 
proceed to the next screen before they make a choice 
about some feature or click some confirmation 
screen). 
• Hyperlinks to outside sites and policies – Users are 
provided clickable links to additional EULAs and 
policies pertaining to the program (i.e., privacy 
policies, terms of service, etc.) 
• Locations of third parties and policies – Users are 
provided information about the location of 
additional information pertaining to the program, 
such as laws, arbitration rules, but are not able to 
access it by via a hyperlink. 
 
Figure 8: Example of a program describing advertising it installs 
• Opt-out options- Users are provided checkboxes or 
radio buttons as a means to opt-out of features that 
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modify existing settings (home page), transmit user 
information or add-ons from third part vendors that 
send information or provide advertisements.  
 
Figure 9: Example of a notice using opt-out 
• Opt-In option – Users are provided checkboxes or 
radio buttons as a means to opt-in of features that 
modify existing settings (home page), transmit user 
information or add-ons from third part vendors that 
send information or provide advertisements. 
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Figure 10: Example of a notice using opt-in 
 
Program Total 
EULA 
words in 
program 
Total 
EULA 
words in 
first 
order 
links 
Total 
EULA 
words 
Estimated 
time to 
read17 in 
minutes 
Edonkey 2745 919 3664 30.53 
Google ToolBar 1922 504 2426 20.21 
KaZaA 17458 193 17651 147.1 
WeatherScope 2856 N/A 2856 23.8 
WebShots 1374 N/A 1374 11.45 
 
Table 14 
 
 
 
 
 
17 Based on 120 efficient words per minute (ewpm) for the average reader. 
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Because the text box EULA was a common means of providing 
information, we examined them in more detail.   We compiled a word 
count of each EULA, calculated the average words per screen, and 
estimated the time it required to read them [Table 14]. In our test, no 
user read an entire EULA, or even substantial portions of it. At best, 
they would scan for keywords, or try to find key sections that were 
interesting. Links to external sites were only clicked five times, (5%). 
When available, users availed themselves of the opt-out option over 
half of the time (52.7%). The option was only available for 3/5 of the 
applications we looked at.  
Program Hyperlinks Locations Opt-Out Opt-In
Opt-out of 
any choices
Go to any 
external links
Edonkey 2 15 6 1 46.40% 0%
Google Toolbar 2 9 1 0 60.70% 3.60%
KaZaA 4 78 0 0 N/A 14%
WeatherScope 0 23 0 0 N/A N/A
WebShots 0 6 1 0 50% N/A
Total 8 131 8 1 52.37% 5.87%  
Table 15 
 
Program Total 
Screen 
Count 
Install 
Screens 
Dedicated 
to EULAs 
Forced 
Choice 
Implicit 
Forced 
Choice
Strict 
Scroll 
Box 
EULA 
Edonkey 7 2 3 2 2 
Google 
Toolbar 3 2 3 1 1 
KaZaA 4 2 3 2 2 
Weather-
Scope 4 1 1 1 1 
WebShots 4 1 2 0 1 
 
Table 16 
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 We also used common readability statistics to estimate the overall 
range of readability of the EULAs. We used the Flesh-Kindkaid 
reading level test in Microsoft word. Flesch Reading ease is a measure 
from 0-100, with a higher score indicating easier reading. We found 
that the EULAs analyzed had Reading Ease measures under 40. All 
EULAs Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level were grade 12.  
3.  EULA DESIGN IMPRESSIONS 
 While we were not able to keep track of the exact time it took 
users to install each and every application during the course of our 
study, we were able to get a general sense of how long users took to 
complete each installation task. In some cases, users completed all of 
the installation screens in less than 15-20 seconds, spending less than a 
couple of seconds per screen.  
 In no case did a user take more than 2-3 minutes to install an 
application. Users were typically able to complete all installations in 
less than 15-20 minutes including the programs actual installation 
time. This time span is obviously insufficient for users to read, let 
alone comprehend, the EULAs. Indeed, the entire time it took users to 
examine, install, and configure all five applications is less than the 
time it would take to read any single EULA presented.  
 In addition to reading times, users confirmed that the text was 
written at a level that thwarted their use and understanding. 
Compounding this problem, we documented a profound disconnect 
between what users expected EULAs to contain and what they 
contained in fact. While users recognized that there was some form of 
agreement, they had widely different, and generally inaccurate, 
impressions about the EULA contents. This mirrors results in earlier 
surveys on web privacy. It is important to note that users were not 
being lazy or careless, rather they simply believed that the majority of 
the information in a EULA did not pertain to them, was too generic, or 
standard “legal mumbo-jumbo.” 
 We join others in concluding that EULAs are ill suited for the task 
of conveying information to consumers and obtaining consent. There 
is little in the design of EULAs that would suggest they are useful for 
informing and educating users. While this is not altogether surprising 
for HCI practitioners, EULAs are currently considered the state of the 
art in notice and consent, and are routinely enforced by courts. Fixing 
EULA design is an important activity with broad implications.   
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VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
 We have conducted a user study in a controlled laboratory setup 
that immersed users in the task of configuring a desktop computer by 
making installation decisions about various software applications. 
Each of the programs contained secondary features that presented the 
user with various trade-offs. Users had to balance their interest in 
potentially desirable features (e.g., screen saver) with privacy, 
security, and performance risks of different magnitudes (e.g., transfer 
of personally identifying information) that were disclosed in the either 
EULA notices or EULA notices in combination with either short 
notices or generic warnings. We found that users are often willing to 
install programs with potentially harmful behaviors in exchange for 
access to software programs with desirable features. Users were 
generally unaware of the potentially negative secondary aspects of the 
programs they installed and did not read the EULA or ToS notices. 
When informed in a post-study interview of the EULA’s contents 
participants often regretted their decision to install programs and 
indicated a desire to undo their actions. 
 In the next step we introduced two additional information 
conditions (Microsoft SP2 warning and Short Notice) to improve 
users’ knowledge and understanding of the EULA terms. Surprisingly, 
we did not find a behavioral change in the number of programs 
installed. Even users that carefully read the Short Notice statements 
were often willing to proceed with the installation of potentially 
harmful programs. 
 In the Short Notice condition, however, users felt better informed, 
evinced greater understanding of potential risks of the software during 
the post-study interview, and had a better understanding of the EULA 
contents and, therefore, program functionality. 
 We suggest that the improved awareness and reduced regret 
indicate that Short Notices move toward a more meaningful notice and 
consent experience.  However, we strongly believe that mutual assent, 
in the legal sense, is largely unachievable given the current state of 
notices and law.  
 Our data suggests that providing for comparison shopping among 
programs with similar primary features prior to installation, may lead 
to increased focus and evaluation of secondary features that negatively 
affect privacy, security, and performance.  
 HCI approaches that improve notice methods can assist users in 
controlling their desktop experience, but alone they are insufficient.  
 
 
